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ABSTRACT
CASSANDRA NICOLE TURNER: “We Never Said We’re Independent”: Natural
Resources, Nationalism, and the Fight for Political Autonomy in Russia’s Regions
(Under the direction of Dr. Joshua First)
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the federal government permitted the regions and
republics to obtain political autonomy, which led to a measure of self-governance during
the 1990s and 2000s. The amount of political autonomy provided to the regions and
republics was affected by the existence of a natural resource sector, and whether or not
the republic or region in question had a nationalized ethnic minority. Natural resource
sector data and federal and regional budgetary data was collected and analyzed from
federal and regional government websites. Historical information on ethnic minorities as
well as information on their anti-federal government protests were collected from
Russian, European, and American newspapers. The republic with the longest-running
natural resources sector and the largest and most anti-government ethnic minority
received the most political autonomy and held it the longest. The region with the most
financially successful natural resources but no nationalized ethnic minority received the
least political autonomy. Regional political autonomy was affected by regional natural
resource wealth, as the federal government heavily relied upon that wealth to fund the
federal budget. The presence of a nationalized ethnic minority was successfully used as a
tool by regional elites to obtain more political autonomy, although when the political
autonomy system began to end they were unable to utilize that tool to keep their
autonomy.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................. 1
CHAPTER I: CONSTITUTIONAL SEPARATISM (1990-1995) ................................. 17
CHAPTER II: REVISING AND RE-ENVISIONING AUTONOMY (1996-2006) ...... 43
CHAPTER III: THE END OF AUTONOMY (2007-2017) ............................................ 51
CONCLUSION................................................................................................................. 59
BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................. 63

1

Introduction1
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the federal government of the Russian
Federation began allowing the regions and republics to obtain political autonomy. The
regions received different levels of political autonomy based upon their production of
natural resources and whether or not there was a significant nationalized ethnic
population to utilize when bargaining with the federal government. The Russian
Federation has always been a multinational country, with over one hundred nationalities.
During the 1920s, the Soviet Union undertook a process called national delimitation,
where it attempted to divide up Russia along ethnic lines. Many of those republics and
regions would exist into the 90s, following the principle of path dependency, where the
modern regions and republics were drawn along the lines of the old regions and
republics, allowing past problems to continue into the future. In 1990, President Boris
Yeltsin told the regions to “take as much sovereignty as you can swallow”2, and they took
the opportunity provided by declaring sovereignty, signing bilateral treaties, and writing
their own constitutions and charters.
The Republic of Tatarstan was the first of all the regions to receive political
autonomy during the 1990’s because of its position as a region with a highly nationalized
ethnic population and possession of a lucrative natural resources sector that has been
instrumental in funding the government, which were both used by regional elites to
1

Title quote from interview with Mansir Ayupov in: Ian Traynor. “Putin Redraws the Map of Russia: Plans to Put the
Kremlin Back in Control Face Resistance in Bashkortostan.” The Guardian (Kings Place, London), May 14, 2000.
2
Traynor.
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leverage Tatarstan into having the most autonomy of any region. The Republic of
Tatarstan was initially granted autonomy in the 1920s, during the period of national
delimitation, due its position as the ancestral home of the Tatar people in the Volga
Region of Russia. Tatars are the second largest ethnic group in the Russian Federation. 3
The government of Tatarstan aggressively pursued greater autonomy as soon as the
opportunity presented itself, as a consequence of its status. The current population of
Tatarstan is about 3.8 million, made up of 53% Tatar, 39.7% Russian, and 7% other
ethnicity.4 In 2000, Tatars held between 70 and 80% of administrative positions, despite
only being about 50% of the population at the time. 5 Tatarstan is one of the only regions
in Russia with a majority population of non-ethnic Russians, and that has led to a greater
sense of nationalism in the region, as it is not only their ancestral homeland, but they are
a majority in the government and in general.
The Republic of Bashkortostan was the second republic to receive political
autonomy during the 1990’s, after Tatarstan, primarily due to its position as a region with
a lucrative national resources sector that was a center of oil refining and its nationalized
ethnic population, which would be used as a bargaining tool with the federal government.
The Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Republic was formally established on March 23rd, 1919,
as the very first national autonomous region in Russia.6 Bashkortostan lies in the Ural
Mountains, in the Volga Federal District. The region was named after the Bashkirs, the
main ethnic group. It is considered a multi-ethnic territory, with the population being

3

Robert Orttung, Danielle Lussier, and Anna Paretskaya, The Republics and Regions of the Russian Federation: a
Guide to Politics, Policies, and Leaders (EastWest Institute, 2000), 539.
4
“Tatarstan,” Geohistory. http://geohistory.today/tatarstan/.
5
Valery Stepanov. “Ethnic Tensions and Separatism in Russia,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 26, no. 2
(2000): 315.
6
“Respublika Bashkortostan,” O respublike, Respublika Bashkortostan. https://www.bashkortostan.ru/republic/about/.
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33% Russian, 29.8% Bashkir, 24.1% Tatar, and 13.1% other. The state languages are
Bashkir and Russian.7 In February 1992, it was officially named the Republic of
Bashkortostan. Bashkortostan’s level of autonomy was greater politically than
economically, and it was unable to maintain it once the federal government began a
campaign to regain centralized control.
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug-Yugra initially received political autonomy
during the early Soviet Union, established on December 10th, 1930 in the Ural Oblast as
the Ostyak-Vogel Ethnic Okrug. 8 In the new wave of political autonomy, it was grouped
together with all of the other regions in Russia, who received autonomy after the
republics. Khanty-Mansi’s autonomy came because of its position as an extremely
resource-rich region, without a nationalized ethnic minority. Governor Filipenko, while
neither Khanty or Mansi, maintained as his top priority gaining greater autonomy, and he
campaigned on obtaining greater economic independence.9 The amount of autonomy that
Khanty-Mansi has been granted during the Soviet Union was minimal and short-lived, as
it was almost immediately placed under the governance of Tyumen Oblast despite the
Okrug’s legal status as an equal constitutional subject, and the autonomy it was granted
in the 90s lasted for an even shorter period of time and existed in name only.
Methodology
The case studies for this thesis were chosen on the basis of their status as
autonomous republics or regions with an ethnic minority presence, which are also one of
the major producers of oil and natural gas in Russia. The three different ethnic groups

7

“Respublika Bashkortostan,” O respublike, Respublika Bashkortostan.
"Brief Historical Information," Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug-Yugra: Official Site of the Public Authorities,
Accessed November 29, 2017, https://admhmao.ru/en/about/general/historical/.
9
Orttung, Lussier, and Paretskaya, 237.
8

4

chosen each make up a different population percentage in their regions. The Tatars are
one of the largest national minorities in the country, the Bashkirs are a significant
minority in their own territory, and the Khanty and the Mansi are so small that they are
barely registered in their own historic homeland. The production of oil and gas in these
republics ranks at the top of the entire country, which has allowed them to fund their
regions without requiring the same amount of federal subsidies as other regions. There
were three bilateral treaties signed that formed the legal basis for the political autonomy
system and each case study signed a different one. Each case study is to be evaluated on
its level of ethnic unity and nationalism, level of oil and gas production, and how long it
maintained autonomy and to what degree it was autonomous. Ethnic nationalism in the
regions and the existence of a significant amount of natural resources, should be proven
to have affected how political autonomy was formed and fought for in the regions.
Nationalism and the possession of lucrative resources created the initial push for further
sovereignty during the early 1990’s. Then, after Putin took power and began cutting
down on the number of regions that had autonomy, natural resource possession became a
liability for maintaining autonomy, and nationalism continued the push for regional
sovereignty. Possession of natural resources directly affected how much political
autonomy regions were able to bargain for with the federal government, despite their use
of regional ethnic nationalism and the threat of independence struggles as another
bargaining tool.
Measuring how influential each region is in terms of natural resources can be
based on published data. The Russian Federation itself as well as each individual region
keeps track of the volume of petroproducts produced, the extent of reserves, and the

5

dollar amount in terms of foreign and domestic contracts each region has to some degree.
Ethnic nationalism in these regions can be measured by the push for laws protecting the
culture of the major ethnic group (i.e., the titular nationality), the amount of support for
political autonomy, the amount of and reasons behind protests over the right to political
sovereignty, and the presence of separatists. The effect of natural resources and
nationalism on political autonomy will be measured by amount of political autonomy
each region received, as well as when it began and how long it lasted. Ultimately there
were different levels of autonomy granted to different regions and republics, and
nationalism and natural resources affected what they were granted in bilateral powersharing agreements.
The Tatars are the majority ethnicity in the Republic of Tatarstan, and intellectual,
religious leaders and politicians have constructed elements of modern nationhood since
the late-imperial period. Tatarstan’s autonomy was in question as recently as July 2017,
when the federal government officially decided to let the bilateral power-sharing
agreement expire. The Republic of Tatarstan is one of the most vital regions for the
Russian government as it is a center of oil and natural gas production. Tatarstan combines
strong nationalism with a lucrative industrial sector, and yet never pushed for full
independence from the central government despite nominally having the ability to
support full nationhood. The Bashkirs are smaller in their own region than the percentage
of ethnic Russians. There have been relatively consistent pushes to protect the Bashkir
culture and language, as the Bashkirs have a strong sense of nationalism, which can be
measured in the number of protests. Bashkortostan declared itself a sovereign state,
before losing autonomy in 2004. It is one of the top areas in Russia for oil processing and
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producing oil and natural gas. However, despite strong nationalism and a lucrative natural
resources sector, they also never pushed for full independence. Khanty-Mansi
Autonomous Okrug-Ugra has never had the same fight for independence, and only
received autonomy because of its position as a region with a minority population. The
Khanty and the Mansi are small and isolated to the point of being almost insignificant,
without a true sense of ethnic nationalism. Khanty-Mansi leads Russia in the production
of oil and natural gas, providing tax revenues to the federal government. Even if the
Khanty and Mansi managed to strongly push for independence, the federal government
would never let the Okrug separate from the central government. The government’s
desire to control the Okrug is contributing to why it is extremely unlikely to ever lead to a
full push for independence. Ethnic nationalism was a bargaining tool used to strengthen
the push for political autonomy in the regions, bolstering natural resource possession.
Literature Review
In Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil, Timothy Mitchell states
that countries that almost exclusively produce natural resources are not always politically
stable.10 The political autonomy system that was created in the 1990’s became officially
codified during a politically and economically unstable time in Russia. It led to continued
instability in the country. He also claims that oil affects the producer state through
funding, in connection to pipelines, refineries, royalties, and negotiations, which allows
the state to avoid any demands from the labor force.11 While primarily seen in the case of
protests over wages and benefits, this theory can also be extended to other protests. After
the demise of the regionally popular political autonomy system, oil prevented the regions
10
11

Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil (New York: Verso, 2011), 5.
Ibid., 11.
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(who provide the labor force for the petro products sector) from being able to regain their
lost autonomy. Nationalism has been used in the regions as a tool for the elites to
coalesce the population behind the regional government, but they have also relied upon
the natural resources for the financial and social benefits. Mitchell also claims that a
worker’s political power in oil producing countries is entirely dependent on how oil is
used and what vulnerabilities those uses have created.12 Regional ethnic groups’ and
regional governments’ political power directly stemmed from the production and sale of
natural resources when negotiating treaties with the federal government. This provided
groups with the ability to negotiate from a position of power that allowed them to receive
concessions from the federal government. The use of natural resource revenues as a
negotiation tool relied upon the use of nationalism to be successful.
Benedict Anderson asserts that nations are “imagined” as the members will never
know, meet, or hear of most of the other members, and that they are imagined as
communities because they are supposed to have a sense of comradeship.13 Russian ethnic
minorities do have a sense of comradeship inside their ethnic groups, and occasionally
with other groups against the Russian federal government. As well, their sense of having
their own “nation” inside the Federation has been related back to long dead members who
were once not Russian and potentially part of their own empires, but those members do
not exist for the modern national minority. He references Ernest Gellner in Thought and
Change who describes nationalism as “the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it
invents nations where they do not exist,”14 which in some cases, regional nationalists and
separatists are doing by arguing that there has always been an undercurrent of revolution
12
13
14

Mitchell, 31.
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (2006), 6-7.
Ibid., 6.
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in the regions. Anderson’s book sees nationalism as a unifying force that may not have
any basis in historical reality.
In Robert W. Orttung’s overview of the Russian regions after the Russian
Constitution had passed, he wrote “it is important for the central government to maintain
good relations with the ethnically defined republics, particularly those which expressed
their desire for autonomy from the center.”15 Kirkow notes that ethnic minorities have a
cultural and historical connection to each other, with common values, traditions,
languages, and identity that do not always match administrative boundaries.16 Stepanov
asserts that national territories with sustained nationalization have a higher potential for
ethnic tension and conflict.17 Sustained nationalization refers to maintaining the group’s
culture, language, etc. as part of their sense of inter-group unity. The Republic of
Tatarstan and the Republic of Bashkortostan both have sustained nationalization, while
Khanty-Mansi did not. Stepanov also states that ethnic tensions will increase if there are
two or more large ethnic groups living next to each other in the same territory, 18 which
applies to all three territories. He ranks Tatarstan and Bashkortostan as “ethnicallytroubled”, but not Khanty-Mansi.19 Tatarstan and Bashkortostan have united ethnic
groups with enough power to fight back against the federal government, but KhantyMansi does not. Nationalism in Russian regions is entirely dependent upon the ethnic
groups involved, as only some of them have united around a history, culture, and
language.

15

Orttung, Lussier, and Paretskaya, 44.
Peter Kirkow, Russia’s Provinces: Authoritarian Transformation versus Local Autonomy? (St. Martin’s Press, Inc.,
1998), 47.
17
Stepanov, 306.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid., 307.
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The Russian Economy, and the Oil Sector
Russia is the world’s largest producer of crude oil, second largest producer of dry
natural gas, and third largest producer of petroleum and other products. Oil and gas
revenues accounted for 43% of all federal budget revenue in 2015. In general, every
dollar increase in the price of oil gives the Russian exchequer one billion dollars in extra
revenue.20 The government controlled domestic energy prices even after the USSR
collapsed.21 By 1994, the only price-controlled exports left, which together accounted for
70% of all exports, included petroleum products and natural gas. 22 The Russian
government heavily relied upon natural resources to fund itself immediately after the
Soviet Union. This time period overlaps with the same period of the regional autonomy
push, and while the government was willing to allow the regions some freedom, it was
highly unlikely to let anything get in the way of the production and sale of natural
resources. The Russian government, because of historical choices to lean heavily on the
sale of natural resources to other countries to fund the state now faces a situation where
they cannot afford to lose control over these resources.
Tatarstan has the sixth largest Gross Regional Product per capita,23 and is the third
largest oil-producing region in Russia.24 The majority of Tatarstan’s wealth comes from
crude oil production.25 Tatarstan is also influential in oil refining.26 Oil is the most

20

"Country Analysis Brief: Russia." U.S. Energy Information Administration - Independent Statistics and Analysis,
October 25, 2016, Accessed September 05, 2017. https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=RUS, 1-5.
21
Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000. (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc.,
2001), 125-126
22
Ibid., 126-127
23
“Tatarstan: the Last Autonomous Republic in Russia,” Stratfor Worldview, July 13, 2017.
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/tatarstan-last-autonomous-republic-russia
24
“The Republic of Tatarstan,” JSC Svyazinvestneftekhim, 2012.
25
“Natural Resources,” Republic of Tatarstan Official Archives, http://19972011.tatarstan.ru/index.html@0&node_id=1362.html.
26
Geohistory.
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significant export for the republic, with 81.6% of total exports in 2014 consisting of
petroproducts,27and in total, the republic trades with firms from over 60 foreign countries.
28

Tatarstan is a donor region to the federal budget in terms of tax revenue because of oil

and gas production and exports.29 Tatarstan is also economically important because of oil
and natural gas transportation. Despite some modern attempts to economically diversify,
the oil and natural gas producing sector of the economy remains the most successful and
has allowed the republic to fund itself almost entirely without the assistance of the
Russian government.
A large portion of the Republic of Bashkortostan’s industry is the processing and
extraction of its raw materials, especially oil and gas.30 It also contains one of the highest
concentrations of petrochemical military industry in all of Russia. 31 As of the late 90’s,
over 50% of the Republic of Bashkortostan’s exports were fuel and energy. 32 It has
extensive foreign economic relations as a consequence of its large amount of natural
resources and production, and in 1997 traded with 71 different countries, with the money
from those exports contributing to 20% of Gross Regional Product.33 The Republic of
Bashkortostan is a major republic for the production and procession of oil and natural
gas, and that has brought it financial success.
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug-Yugra is one of, it not the, most important
region to the federal budget because of its extremely lucrative production of natural gas
and oil. Khanty-Mansi is a leader in Russian oil and gas production, industrial output,
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

“Guide to Investment: Republic of Tatarstan,” PWC, Republic of Tatarstan, 2015, 15.
Orttung, Lussier, and Paretskaya, 539.
JSC Svyazinvestneftekhim, 2012.
Orttung, Lussier, and Paretskaya, 41.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., 44.
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power generation, and equity investment.34 Current predictions estimate that KhantyMansi will continue to be the main production center for raw hydrocarbons for at least
the next few decades based on explored and proved reserves, production, industrial
infrastructure, and commercial viability for the oil fields.35 Khanty-Mansi is number one
in oil production, and is number two in natural gas production and the the amount of tax
revenue contributed to the federal budget36 in Russia. Because Khanty-Mansi produces
over 60% of Russian oil and is a net donor to the federal budget it is of great strategic
importance.37 There are 107 thousand kilometers of pipelines38 that allow the Okrug to
export what it produces to border countries. About ninety-nine percent of all exports
consist of crude oil.39 Given how much Khanty-Mansi exports, the revenues for both the
region and the federal government are astronomical.
The federal budget relies heavily upon the taxation of natural resources produced
in the regions, so politicians work to maximize regional resource extraction for federal
gain. As can be seen in Figure 1, the total consolidated budget of the Federation’s
constituent entities, i.e. the regions, is a significant amount of the actual federal budget.
The federal government taxes the regional economies, so when the regions are successful
the federal government will be as well. The total federal budget is significantly impacted
by regional budget revenues. Each year, the segment of the federal budget that comes
from the regions is fairly large, even in 2014 when the federal budget is larger than
34

"Brief Historical Information," Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug-Yugra: Official Site of the Public Authorities,
Accessed November 29, 2017, https://admhmao.ru/en/about/general/historical/.
35
Ibid.
36
"Ekonomika," Khanty-Manciickii Avtomonyi Okryg-Yugra: Edinyi Ofitsialnyi Sait Gosydarstvennyx Organov,
Accessed October 08, 2017, https://admhmao.ru/ob-okruge/obshchie-svedeniya/ekonomika/.
37
Orttung, Lussier, and Paretskaya, 237.
38

“West-Siberian Oil and Gas Province,” Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug-Yugra: Official Site of the Public
Authorities, Accessed November 29, 2017, https://admhmao.ru/en/about/general/historical/.
39
Khanty-Manciickii Avtomonyi Okryg-Yugra: Edinyi Ofitsialnyi Sait Gosydarstvennyx Organov, "Ekonomika."
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normal. As can be seen in Figures 2, 3, and 4, the general movement of the federal budget
follows the general movement of the regional budgets. While there are other factors
affecting the movement of the federal budget, over all and over time, if the regional
budgets are increasing so is the federal budget. As Khanty-Mansi’s GRP increases, so
does the GDP, complete with spike around 2008. Bashkortostan’s and Tatarstan’s are less
directly correlated, but the general trend remains similar. It is only around 2013 and 2014
that the trends begin to diverge, which could be attributed to geopolitical factors. Tax
revenue is how the federal government collects federal funding from the regions, and a
significant part of those taxes comes from the natural resource sector and exports. As a
consequence of these regional revenues, the federal government was willing to do what
they regions wanted when making bilateral treaties to some extent.

Fig. 1 “Annual Budget Revenues by Contribution to the Federal Budget of the Russian Federation.”
Source: “The Information on Execution of Budgets of the Budgetary System of the Russian Federation Annually as of
January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2016,” Federal Treasury, 2017.
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Fig 2. “Yearly GDP of the Russian Federation vs. Yearly GRP of the Republic of Tatarstan.”
Source: “GDP (current million US$),” Data, The World Bank; “Obem i izmenenie valovovo regialnovo produkta v
osnovnix tsenax v Respublike Tatarstan, May 2017,” Territorial’nyi organ Federal-noi sluzhby gosydarstvennoi
statistiki po Respublike Tatarstan.

Fig. 3. “Yearly GDP of the Russian Federation vs. Yearly GRP of the Republic of Bashkortostan.”
Source: “GDP (current million US$),” Data, The World Bank; “Makroekonomika,” Territorial’nyi organ Federal’noi
sluzhbi gosudarstvennoi statistiki po Respublike Bashkortostan.

Fig. 4 ‘Yearly GDP of the Russian Federation vs. Yearly GRP of Khani-Mansi Autonomous Okrug.”
Source: Indeksi fizicheskovo obioma valovovo regional’novo prodykta v osnovnih tsenax (protsent, znachenie
pokazatelja za god). Federalnaya slyzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki. Territoral’nyi organ Federalnoy slyzhby
rosydarpstvennoi statistiki po Khanty-Manciickomu AO-IUGRPA; “GDP (current million US$),” Data, The World
Bank.
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Granting regional governments the ability to somewhat govern themselves began
to threaten the federal government’s ability to strongly control these resources from
production to final shipment abroad. On the other hand, it gave regional governments a
place of strength when initially bargaining for the right to political autonomy. Ultimately,
the federal government’s desire for control over natural resources, and the increase in
federal power, helped lead to the cracking down and eventual end to the political
autonomy system. The federal government indiscriminately allowed the regions to obtain
autonomy, and then indiscriminately took it back once the drawbacks to decentralization
became obvious.
Ethnic Nationalism in Autonomous Regions
Tatar nationalism is evident as the majority Tatar regional government has
enshrined Tatar culture into law and a separatist movement has been a consistent
presence in the Republic. Even when the republic was allowed to be mostly separate from
the federal government and essentially rule itself, the separatist movement did not fade
away completely despite seeing that there were laws in their favor passed by the regional
government. The regional government also passed laws protecting the Tatar language, an
important factor of culture, before the federal government agreed to pass those laws as
well.
Ethnic nationalism in Bashkortostan is visible through the legal protection of the
Bashkir language and religion, and presence of nationalists and their protests against the
central government. Bashkortostan has protected Bashkir language and culture by having
Bashkir language facilities, schools, and media. Mansir Ayupov was a member of the
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regional government when he called all ethnic Russians “imperialist.”40 He was not the
only one who had strong pro-Bashkir views and extreme anti-federal government views
in the 1990s. Historic ethnic tension stems from tactics employed during the Russian
Empire to drive the Bashkirs off of their land, which decreased their homeland and
population size. During the 1990s and into the present day, protests have stemmed from
the federal government’s actions.
Khanty-Mansi does not have a nationalized ethnic population. The Khanty and the
Mansi, the titular nationalities of the autonomous Okrug, only make up about 1.86% of
the population combined.41 During the Soviet Union, the central government heavily
promoted a policy of natural resource extraction and development, and the Khanty and
Mansi were pushed off of their land.42 Most of the remaining Khanty and Mansi do not
follow their traditions any longer,43 due to decades of migration into Siberia which made
their traditional, reindeer-herding nomadic lifestyle difficult, and historical religious
persecution. The advent of oil and natural gas production in Khanty-Mansi was a boon to
the federal and regional economies, but it saw the beginning of the end for the nomadic
Khanty and Mansi peoples who could not be nationalized as they were living in a region
that barely registered their existence, much less their culture.
This thesis will be structured into three chapters focused on the three main time
periods, ending with a conclusion chapter. Each chapter will focus on how the three
regions were affected by ethnic nationalism and natural resources in terms of their
political autonomy. The push for political autonomy in Russian regions was initiated by
40

Traynor.
Victoria Vorobeva, Zoya Fedorinova, and Ekaterina Kolesnik, “Three Crucial Crises in the Development of the
Khanty and Mansi’s Unique Culture,” Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences 206 (2015): 109.
42
Ibid., 111.
43
Ibid., 109.
41
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the regional governments using the amount of natural resources in each region and the
presence of nationalism in the local ethnic minority populations as bargaining tools to
bolster their attempts to gain sovereignty. However, when the federal government turned
on the regions in an attempt to consolidate power, the regions were unable to rely upon
those bargaining tools to maintain their sovereignty.

17

Constitutional Separatism: 1990-1995
When Yeltsin promised the regions a chance at official sovereignty, they
immediately began declaring sovereignty and dragging the federal government into a
decades-long fight. The federation treaty passed in March 1992 gave the republics state
sovereignty, ethnic language and citizenship recognitions, and increased rights to the
control of natural resources, fiscal autonomy, and international trade.44 Between 1992 and
1994, most regions signed bilateral power-sharing agreements with the federation
government that would allow each one to have some kind of preferential treatment,
primarily involving taxes.45 The bilateral power sharing agreements codified the right of
the regions and republics to have a semblance of sovereignty from the federal
government. The argument over sovereignty began with the federal government
hesitantly following through with their promise.
The official Constitution of the newly formed Russian Federation was signed on
December 12th, 1993. It states that the constitution of the Russian Federation and federal
laws have supremacy. The federation consists of republics, territories, regions, cities of
federal importance, autonomous regions, and autonomous areas, all of which are stated to
be equal subjects of the Russian Federation. It allows republics to have their own
constitutions and legislation, and allows regions, etc. to have their own charter. The
constitution is given the “supreme judicial force” in the federation, and any other laws

44
45

Peter Kirkow, 47.
Ibid., 63.
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made by other legislatures cannot contradict it. Republics are permitted to establish their
own state languages, which means that republics with a significant national minority
population can elevate that minority language to be equal with Russian. Joint jurisdiction
of the Russian Federation and its subjects are stated to include: the utilization of natural
resources, the coordination of international and foreign economic relations of federal
subjects, and the fulfillment of international treaties.46 The federal government is
permitted to own natural resources or to allow one of the large oil and gas companies in
the country to own them. Essentially, the constitution ensures that as much as possible,
the federation remains in control of the regions, as it is directly stated in the federal
constitution that regional laws, charters, and constitutions are subordinate to federal legal
acts. It also sets up the contradictory position of natural resources, where they are at once
meant to be for the support of the people and are to be controlled by the federal
government.
The Republic of Tatarstan
In 1990, the Republic of Tatarstan adopted the Declaration on the State
Sovereignty of the Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic, a direct consequence of Yeltsin’s
proclamation to the regions and republics that obtaining sovereignty was allowed. It was
the first true declaration of the right to autonomy for the Republic of Tatarstan. The
Declaration was meant to help ensure the inherent rights of Tatars and the Republic’s
population to self-determination and seeks to create a legal sovereign democratic state. It
lays out that land and natural resources are the exclusive property of the Tatar people. It
ensures that the Tatar Constitution and the acts of the regional government are supreme in
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the Republic of Tatarstan.47 The Declaration of State Sovereignty specifically mentions
that land and natural resources are the property of the Tatar people, pulling it away from
federal control. Oil production in Tatarstan was already vital to the federal budget, and
both the Republic and the Federation knew how much money was at stake. Tatarstan
specifically naming natural resources was deliberate so that the federal government
would have to listen to their demands for autonomy. Proclaiming state sovereignty
appeased the separatists but was largely meant as a symbol to the federal government that
the Republic was serious about threatening independence if they were not granted
economic control.
On March 21st, 1992 the Republic of Tatarstan held a referendum on becoming a
sovereign state, and a subject of international law, which passed by 61.4%.48 The
Tatarstan Supreme Soviet told the population that the referendum was simply to change
the region’s status to a sovereign state and not to declare independence. 49 Even after the
long history of pushing for autonomy in the republic, the Republic refused to declare
independence. The referendum asked citizens of the Republic of Tatarstan: “Do you
agree that the Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign state, a subject of international law,
building its relations with the Russian Federation and other republics on an equal
basis?”50 President Yeltsin denounced the action afterwards as an act that “presupposes
that Tatarstan is not part of Russia,” 51 which was along the lines of what the Tatar
government wanted. Tatar separatists, who believed that the federal government had been
47
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been robbing them since the Khanate of Kazan fell, threatened a “liberation struggle”
were the federal government to attempt to block the referendum. 52 This marked the first
break with the regional government, who was strongly opposed to an actual civil war.
The federal legislature claimed that the referendum would cause further ethnic strife
because while half of Tatarstan’s population is ethnic Tatar, the rest is a mix of ethnic
Russians and other minorities. 53 Despite the benefits to sovereignty, the regional
government was careful to ensure that it was not separating too far as they did not want to
lose the support of the federal government completely. They were also careful not to lose
the support of Tatar separatists, who were pushing for a total separation of the republic
from Russia.
The Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, signed in 1992, lays out the legal
basis for the Republic to function as a partially independent state under the Russian
Federation. The Republic of Tatarstan is a subject of the Russian Federation but has
sovereignty that must consist of full state authority legislatively, executively, and
judicially.54 This allows the Republic to rule itself without requiring the input of the
federal government, but does not permit it to become its own country. Even in the
constitution, which creates the legal set-up of Tatarstan as a sovereign state, the regional
government refused to declare independence. The Republic of Tatarstan is permitted to
independently participate in international economic relations.55 This is one of the most
important parts of the constitution because it states one of Tatarstan's real goals by
declaring and pushing for autonomy - the right to independently export natural resources
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without the direct control of the federal government. The Republic can exercise its own
legal regulation, and Tatarstan’s legal acts are held up over the Federation’s.56 This
places the legal acts of the Republic on its territory as more important than federal law,
which would violate the federal constitution, passed a year later. At the time, the federal
government was fearful that the Tatar government would shut down the production of oil
and did not force them to amend this article. The constitution protects the nominal
sovereignty of the Republic, in the understanding that it is still a subject of the Russian
Federation and tacitly supports the Republic’s unofficial independence. It allows
Tatarstan to balance between declaring sovereignty from the federal government and
maintaining a level of economic and political independence.
Most importantly for the economic situation of the Republic of Tatarstan, it is
entitled to “enter into economic relationships with subjects and administrative-territorial
units of foreign states, foreign states, [and] conclude international agreements.”57 This
provides Tatarstan with the actual autonomy it wanted - the ability to have international
economic relationships that does not need the interference of the federal government.
Natural resource exports provide the republic with a large amount of budget revenues,
and by stating that the republic would be able to enter into these trade deals alone
supposedly it would have allowed the republic to hold onto more of the revenues and
send less to the federal government. Tatarstan is also able to have economic relationships
with other Russian federal subjects.58 This goes a bit further and allows the republic to
make economic deals with the rest of Russia (i.e. with the regions that send oil and
natural gas to Tatarstan for refining) without the oversight of the federal government. If
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the federal government is not in charge of these deals, Tatarstan can more easily make a
deal that economically benefits itself and not the federal government. As well, the
constitution laid out that natural resources are supposed to be used and protected in order
to sustain the citizens of the Republic.59 That sets the legal basis for total regional control
of the natural resource sector, by claiming Tatar resources for Tatar citizens alone. It also
applies to exports because the case can easily be made that the sale of natural resource is
a vital part of sustaining the life of Tatar citizens. Related to this, all budgetary funds of
the Republic of Tatarstan, as well as any other property that contributes to the economic
self-sufficiency of the republic, belongs to the citizens.60 This doubles down on the idea
that all money made from the sale of natural resources, as well as any taxes and duties
levied on said sale, have to stay within the confines of the republic, thus placing the
economic rights of the republic above the federal government which is still technically in
charge. The Republic’s state council has jurisdiction over legislative regulation, budget
approval, taxes and duties.61 The regional government thought that economic autonomy
was more important than anything else because the ability to make their own taxes and
levy their own duties would change the amount of revenues that Tatarstan could keep.
The ability to make their own legislative regulations over companies that operate on the
territory is another path to direct regional control over the natural resource sector.
The Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan was written to protect the economy,
especially the natural resource sector, from federal control. It was only by declaring
political autonomy that the Republic was able to find an excuse to attempt to fully wrest
control of the production and sale of oil and natural gas from the federal government. It
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provides a cultural excuse as well, by claiming that natural resources and budget revenues
are meant to be used by the citizens of Tatarstan only, which does imply Tatars as they
were supported political autonomy more than any other group in Tatarstan. The federal
government was willing to allow Tatarstan to pass this constitution because of the
amount of oil and natural gas that it had produced and maintained at the time, which was
important for financial stability. The risk of reprisals shutting the government off from a
lucrative resource was enough to allow the republic to declare total control.
The Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan signed a treaty entitled “On
the Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects and Mutual Delegation of Powers between the
State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan”
on February 2nd, 1994. The treaty was signed after every other region signed on to the
same one in 1992, when Tatarstan refused as it did not feel that the federal government
went far enough. The federal government felt that keeping Tatarstan in line was
important enough that it wrote a separate treaty entirely for the Republic. In keeping with
the constitution, the treaty allows the republic to form its own budget, to define and
impose its own taxes, and to impose legal regulations on natural resources.62 The federal
government, spooked after the earlier referendum, did not take away the right of the
Republic to economic control. It allowed the Republic to continue to have its own
separate budget without federal oversight. The ability to create regional taxes separate
from the central government allowed the Republic to have the power to fund itself as it
saw fit. Tatarstan is allowed to decide issues related to the possession, use, and disposal
of any natural resources, which are considered to be the exclusive property of Tatarstan
62
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unless claimed by the federal government.63 While the constitution had not included the
clause about federal claims, this still backs up the regional government’s ability to
completely control the natural resource sector. This is also an instance of the federal
government reminding the Republic that it is not independent. The treaty allows
Tatarstan to establish and maintain relations and to conclude its own treaties and
agreements with other parts of the Federation.64 This also backs up the constitution, and
allows Tatarstan a level of autonomy economically.
In the same vein, Tatarstan can participate in international affairs, establish
relations with foreign states, and conclude relevant agreements not contradicting the
constitution and international obligations of the Federation, constitution of Tatarstan, and
this treaty.65 While the ability to create its own international economic agreements
follows the constitution, the treaty institutes the agreement that regional agreements may
not contradict federal law. The federal government was not entirely willing even at this
point to allow Tatarstan complete freedom when making international political and
economic agreements. Tatarstan is also allowed to conduct independent foreign economic
activity, but Tatarstan has to jointly coordinate international and foreign economic
relationships with the federal government.66 While slightly contradictory, this statement
also changes the constitution’s proclamation that Tatarstan has the ability to make these
relations alone and inserts the federal government into international economic
relationships - especially export deals. They must also jointly address the matter of
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natural resource use. 67 That also contradicts the constitution, which had stated that
Tatarstan had the exclusive right to decide how to utilize natural resources. The federal
government was unwilling to let Tatarstan do this alone, out of federal jurisdiction, when
Tatar oil and natural gas helped fund the federal budget. Tatarstan’s refusal to sign onto
the same deal as everyone else got it a more personalized agreement, that allowed it to
have almost full control over its own production and sale of natural resources. That alone
would allow Tatarstan to almost fund itself without requiring federal subsidies. The
possession of natural resources allowed Tatarstan to receive a large amount of de facto
independence because it provided an economic cushion against potential reprisals from
the federal government. For the federal government, the glimmer of a potential conflict in
1992 forced it to allow Tatarstan more economic leeway than any other region or
republic. Tatarstan’s economic agreements showed that the largest reason for declaring
sovereignty and gaining political autonomy was to have more control over the natural
resource sector.
Mintimer Shaimiev, the President of the Republic of Tatarstan from 1991 to 2010,
was the first regional leader to sign a power-sharing agreement with the federal
government,68 thus codifying political autonomy to a greater extent than in the
constitution. Shaimiev helped to keep violent conflicts from occurring by putting
nationalists in power, playing the center off the regional government, and using the Tatar
economy to avoid the worst consequences of Russian shock therapy,69 which refers to the
post-Soviet policy of privatizing industry, releasing price controls, and stopping subsidies
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all at once. He brought secession supporters into the government,70 which helped to cool
down some ethnic tensions in the region by giving the separatists a voice. Shaimiev
understood that no matter how much some elements in the country might have wanted
actual independence from the federal government, so much of their economy relied on
the assistance of the center that Tatarstan would have to compromise. Tatarstan managed
to keep most of its oil profits in the region, avoid the worst parts of shock therapy, sign
contracts with foreign investors, and heavily reduce their payments to the federal
budget,71 which would not have been possible without their de facto independence.
Tatarstan was dependent on Russian pipelines, and yet the federal government allowed it
to keep the duties from the sale and production of oil and gas, while Moscow collected
federal taxes.72 Tatarstan is separate from the center in ideology, legislation, and the
economy, but it will never start a war of independence. 73 Tatarstan is economically
dependent on the federal government, and the federal government is economically
dependent on Tatarstan. Natural resources have both given Tatarstan leverage in
sovereignty discussions, but also kept it from having the ability to separate.
The Republic of Bashkortostan
The Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Bashkir Soviet Socialist Republic
was signed on October 11th, 1990, as the first official document declaring sovereignty for
Bashkortostan. It proclaims state sovereignty throughout the territory.74 Bashkortostan
capitalized on the federal promise to let the regions have a measure of sovereignty. In
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part, it was written because the Bashkir government did not feel that having the status of
an autonomous republic was enough to ensure the socioeconomic development of the
territory.75 The Bashkir government declared sovereignty to protect the economic future
of the the republic from the federal government. The constitution also declares that
natural resources on the territory of Bashkortostan, as well as the entire economic,
scientific, and technical future potential of the republic is the exclusive property of the
people who live there.76 The Declaration placed natural resources under the direct control
of the Bashkir government, supposedly for the future of the citizens. Realistically, the
government was concerned about the economy not their citizens, but the document’s
wording lays the groundwork for claiming natural resources as a part of Bashkir freedom.
The Declaration also directly lies out that when the government of Bashkortostan enters
into a relationship with any other part of the USSR or the USSR itself, Bashkortostan
retains all state power.77 The regional government began to separate itself from the
federal government in terms of economic agreements by claiming that Bashkortostan is
not beholden to the federal government during economic negotiations. The sovereignty
declaration also lays out that the supreme laws of the land on Bashkir territory are the
constitution and laws of Bashkortostan, unless it voluntarily transferred a sphere of legal
regulation to the federal government.78 This places the laws of Bashkortostan above
federal laws, which was technically illegal at the time, and ensured that that there was
still a way to backtrack in case the federal government threatened reprisals for the
sovereignty declaration. The entire push for sovereignty in Bashkortostan was over the
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ability to control the production and refining of oil on the territory which funded the
republic’s economy.
The Treaty on the Delimitation of the Subjects of Jurisdiction and Powers
Between the Federal Bodies of State Power of the Russian Federation and the Authorities
of the Sovereign Republics within the Federation was signed on the 1st of March 1992. It
was the first federal document to officially lay out different legal jurisdictions for the
federal government and the republics. It states that the jurisdiction of federal bodies
includes foreign policy and international relations and foreign economic relations.79 This
blocks Bashkortostan from engaging in foreign trade alone, a large part of the economy,
and from creating new economic relationships without the knowledge of the federal
government. Joint jurisdiction between the federal government and the republics includes
ensuring that the republics’ laws and constitutions are consistent with the federal
constitution and laws, and establishing general taxes and fees. 80 This lays out the legal
basis for political autonomy in the republics, where regional laws are subordinate to
federal laws. Regional laws are limited to the narrow scope of anything already federally
legal, limiting autonomy. The treaty also forces Bashkortostan’s taxes to be approved by
the federal government, which implies that the federal government can force the republic
to change them if a new tax in the Republic limits the tax revenue sent to the federal
budget.
The Federation allowed the republics to be independent participants in
international and foreign economic relations, as long as they coordinate with the federal
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government, and to make agreements with other republics, territories, regions, and
autonomous regions in Russia only if they do not contradict federal laws and the federal
constitution.81 This is slightly contradictory to the article above stating that the federal
government was in charge of foreign economic relations, but it does allow the republics
limited representation to advocate for themselves. As Bashkortostan relies heavily upon
exports, this clause placates the regional government by allowing it to be a part of trade
negotiations, as long as the federal government is present. It also allows the republic’s
government to make economic agreements with other parts of the Russian Federation,
which also ensures that the Bashkir government remains settled because it protects their
oil refineries. However, it ensures that all of these economic deals are under federal law,
and the federal government could declare agreements it does not feel are beneficial to the
federal budget unconstitutional or illegal. The treaty does allow for natural resources to
be the property of the peoples living on the republics’ territories, but issues of ownership
and use of natural resources are to be regulated jointly.82 Allowing the regional
government the ability to claim natural resources as their property placates both the
Bashkir government and Bashkir nationalists, but the federal government refused to allow
them total control over these resources. The governments of the republics were granted
some political independence, but the federal government refused to allow them to have
much economic independence. Bashkortostan was unable to advocate for a better deal,
because it did not want to put its natural resources sector in jeopardy.
The Constitution of the Republic of Bashkortostan was officially signed on the
21st of December 1993. It states that the Republic possesses total state power outside the
81
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jurisdictional boundaries of the Russian Federation, and that it must follow the federal
constitution.83 In their own constitution, Bashkortostan had to agree to be subordinate to
the federal government, despite their position as a somewhat sovereign state.
Bashkortostan’s constitution has the highest legal force in matters referred to its
jurisdiction, must be applied throughout the republic, and cannot be contradicted.84
Despite previously agreeing that a condition of their autonomy was to put the federal
constitution first in their republic, the Bashkir constitution backtracks and grants itself the
highest legal authority in the republic. The Bashkir government is not permitted to pass
laws that abolish or diminish the rights and freedoms of citizens, but the federal
government can.85 While Bashkortostan cannot limit rights in the republic, as a nod to
their own ethnic minorities, they legally allowed the federal government to do so, which
would allow them to blame any limiting of ethnic rights and increased ethnic tensions on
the federal government - which ensures that the federal government would be wary of
limiting any rights. The head of the Republic of Bashkortostan must know the state
languages, Bashkir and Russian.86 Technically, this is unconstitutional because less than
30% of the population was Bashkir, and it violated their own article stating that they
could not limit the rights of any citizens. The Bashkir government’s abilities, actions,
relations with state authorities of the federation’s constituent entities are determined
under both federal and Bashkir law. 87 This forces the republic’s government to follow
federal law to have economic and political relationships with other parts of Russia, and
even when it is trying to pass laws for itself. The constitution lays out that political
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autonomy in the Republic of Bashkortostan is not full autonomy, as the Republic is still
beholden to the federal constitution and laws in most cases.
Bashkortostan’s constitution has several articles that were added to provide the
republic with a basis for economic autonomy. The constitution specifically states that
natural resources are to be used and protected as the basis for life and work of the
multinational peoples who live in the republic.88 This article allows the regional
government to make economic decisions on the basis that they are meant to help and
support the Bashkirs who live in the republic. Management and disposal of natural
resources are to be done in accordance with federal laws and agreements between the
Federation and the Republic.89 That allows Bashkortostan to argue that natural resources
are mostly under regional control, but forces them to cooperate with the federal
government when drilling and refining natural resources. The Republic has claimed all of
its own budget funds and any other property necessary for carrying out tasks and
functions of the republic.90 This creates some economic sovereignty by stating in the
constitution that all funds used to fund the regional government are Bashkortostan’s, and
are not able to be transferred to the federal government. Claiming property allows
Bashkortostan to declare a wide variety of buildings, land, and materials for solely
regional use, which allows the regional government to claim that the natural resources
sector is necessary because it funds the region. The Republic is permitted to carry out
international and foreign economic relations.91 This power was already granted to
Bashkortostan in the initial treaty, which was then codified in the constitution to ensure

88
89
90
91

Ibid., St. 9.
Ibid., St. 9.
St. 10 Konstitutsiya RB.
Ibid., St. 15.

32

that the Republic did have the power to make its own international economic deals, in
order to maintain regional funding. Bashkortostan is constitutionally permitted to
conclude treaties and agreements with the administrative territorial entities, subjects, and
state authorities of foreign states in accordance with Russian federal law.92 Bashkortostan
understood that the export of natural resources is what allows the region to require
limited to no federal subsidies, and so it laid out that it would be allowed to have treaties
with every subset of foreign entities, as well as maintain control over its own natural
resources even if it has to do so under federal law.
On August 3rd 1994, the Republic of Bashkortostan signed a power-sharing
agreement with the federal government. Bashkortostan was only the second republic to
sign a power-sharing agreement,93 modeled after the successful treaty signed by the
Republic of Tatarstan earlier in the year. It officially makes Bashkortostan a fully-fledged
subject of the Russian Federation, and a sovereign state within the Russian Federation.94
This muddies the legal status of Bashkortostan by creating a situation where it is at once
its own sovereign state and a Russian subject beholden to Russian laws, which would set
the stage for legal trouble between the republic and the federation. The republic was
granted all legislative, executive, and judicial state power within its borders outside of
what the Federation held.95 This article sets the legal basis for Bashkortostan, supposedly
sovereign, to still be a part of the federation that has to follow federal laws. It also grants
Bashkortostan the right to its own constitution and legislation,96 which allows it to pass
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laws and gives it the right to have a constitution, which grants Bashkortostan’s autonomy
more legitimacy than a charter. The Republic of Bashkortostan’s jurisdiction includes:
protecting the rights of national minorities, forming the state budget, defining taxes and
fees in the budget, using and disposing of natural resources, managing questions of
citizenship in the territory, etc. 97 Allowing Bashkortostan the right to protect the rights of
national minorities, implying the Bashkirs, was granted to help calm down ethnic tension
in the region because the regional government could make laws protecting the Bashkirs
without federal oversight. The ability to make their own state budget including taxes and
fees allow the republics to have a measure of economic sovereignty when funding the
republic, which appeased the regional government who did control an economic sector
that helped to fund the federal government.
Natural resources are left to the jurisdiction of Bashkortostan specifically because
they are considered to be the property of the peoples that live there,98 implying that
Bashkortostan inserted that clause in order to maintain control of its most lucrative
product using the excuse of protecting the Bashkirs. Joint jurisdiction includes
coordinating international and foreign economic relations, and ensuring the unimpeded
and duty-free movement of products along all types of routes, one of which is specifically
stated to be pipeline transport.99 The federal government was willing to let Bashkortostan
have control over natural gas and oil, but was determined to stay involved in the transport
and sale, which would prevent Bashkortostan from being able to fully separate.
Bashkortostan relies more upon refining than production, which means that it needs both
a place to transport oil from and a place to sell oil to, both of which the federal
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government ensured that it could oversee. While Bashkortostan was granted political
autonomy and managed to get some concessions for the national minorities on their
territory, it was only granted limited economic freedom with the federal government
ensuring that it had at least a small level of oversight as the federal government collects
tax revenue off of regional economic activity.
These documents formed the legal basis of the Republic of Bashkortostan’s
political autonomy. Bashkortostan was allowed great political freedoms as long as they
did not contradict federal laws and the federal constitution. Bashkortostan was permitted
to be relatively economically autonomous, as they could control their own regional
economy but had to make foreign economic decisions jointly with the federal
government. Concessions were made to offset the likelihood of increased ethnic tension
in the region, but because the Bashkirs are outnumbered by other ethnic groups, the
concessions were small. However, there is a significant amount of Tatars in the region,
and they are likely to unite with the Bashkirs against the federal government.
Bashkortostan received the concessions it did because the government was aware of the
consequence of angering a center of oil refining and production, and that if they angered
the population or government enough to close off the border or refuse to sell natural
resources, that the federal government would suffer.
The Bashkir elite did not appreciate attempts by the federal government to strip
the regions and republics of their autonomy.100 Mansir Rakhimov, president of
Bashkortostan from 1993 to 2010, came to power in the republic as part of a regional
agreement among the elite that wanted to maintain control over natural resources when
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bargaining with the federal government.101 The elite began to worry that they gave too
much power to the federal government, and that it would take more. Through the powersharing agreement, Bashkortostan was able to reform its own way taking into account its
unique history and ethnic minorities, which helped it be economically strong.102 It was
able to become a donor region to the federal budget, and to develop its resources further,
which in turn were the reason Bashkortostan could economically develop.103 The Bashkir
elite did not want to run the risk of jeopardizing the good economic situation in the
Republic with federal interference. The Russian constitutional court declared the law
forcing presidential candidates to speak Bashkir unconstitutional, but the Bashkir
government never officially repealed it. 104 While Bashkirs are a small portion of the
population, they are 67.5% of the Cabinet of Ministers and 58.5% of the heads of towns
and district administrations,105 and so the Bashkirs in government saw the law as
protecting their outsized governmental majority and their minority population.
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug-Yugra
Khanty-Mansi signed a bilateral power-sharing agreement on March 31st, 1992
with the federal government, along with all of the other non-republic federal subjects.
The federal government was in control of foreign policy, international relations,
international treaties, and foreign economic relations, etc.106 This takes away KhantyMansi’s right to make trade deals with other countries, when exporting to other countries
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is essentially its entire economy. The federal government claimed this power in order to
prevent Khanty-Mansi from circumventing the federal government when making a
lucrative agreement. The treaty declares that autonomous regions are independent
participants in international and foreign economic relations and in agreements with
federal subjects within the Federation.107 This allows Khanty-Mansi to advocate for itself
in international and domestic agreements, but it cannot do so without the oversight and
presence of the federal government, as the federal government actually carries out
negotiations. Joint jurisdiction between the regions and federal government includes
taxation, nature management, and legislation involving land, water, and forests.108 This
permits the federal government to be involved in regional taxes, which prevents the
regions from keeping too much revenue from the federal government. Nature
management and legislation can be used to affect where new oil wells and natural gas
fields can be drilled, and the federal government involved itself in order to ensure that it
can force Khanty-Mansi to leave more land to the oil companies. Issues of possession,
use, and disposal of natural resources in the autonomous regions are to be regulated by
the Russian Federation and regional legislation.109 Khanty-Mansi is not allowed to
control its own production of oil and natural gas. Essentially, Khanty-Mansi signed a deal
that prevented it from truly being autonomous, as its entire economy was under the
oversight of the federal government.
On April 26th, 1995, Khanty-Mansi signed its charter, which functioned like a less
powerful constitution. The charter states that Khanty-Mansi is allowed to exercise legal
107

Ibid., St. 3.
Ibid., St. 2.
109
St. 3, Dogovor o razgranichenii predmetov vedeniya i polnomochiy mezhdu federal'nymi organami
gosudarstvennoy vlasti Rossiyskoy Federatsii i organami vlasti avtonomnoy oblasti, avtonomnykh okrugov v sostave
Rossiyskoy Federatsii.
108

37

regulation on topics that are under joint jurisdiction, as long as it is in accordance with
federal law.110 Even in its own charter, Khanty-Mansi is unable to rule itself as all laws
have to follow federal law and the constitution. Khanty-Mansi is allowed to enter into
agreements with other subjects of the Russian Federation.111 Khanty-Mansi essentially
needs to import everything except energy, and the ability to enter into agreements with
other parts of the Russian Federation without the oversight of the federal government was
a boon. Regions are allowed to unite resources with state authorities in other parts of the
country, as well.112 This allows Khanty-Mansi to work with other parts of the Russian
Federation in case it needs economic assistance without the permission of the federal
government, which provides a measure of economic sovereignty. Khanty-Mansi and the
Russian Federation are to work together in terms of protecting civil rights, specifically
the rights of national minorities, nature management and environmental protection.113
This allows the federal government oversight of Khanty-Mansi’s treatment of the small
population of national minorities, and the federal government can pass any laws
governing the treatment of national minorities and Khanty-Mansi has to implement it. As
well, the federal government inserted itself into laws governing nature management and
environmental protection to protect its budget revenues and prevent the regional
government from protecting the environment if they felt it would affect their bottom line.
National minorities are given privileges on land and nature use, and can have reserve
territories for their use.114 Supposedly this was meant to protect the culture and
livelihoods of those Khanty and Mansi who still choose to live the traditional way, but it
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has not happened. The Khanty and the Mansi are small enough and not united that there
is nothing they can do to fight back against the federal and regional governments.
The Okrug is entitled to participate in international and foreign economic
relations, and the federal government can also participate in foreign economic relations,
conclude appropriate agreements, and participate in the implement of international
treaties.115 This allows Khanty-Mansi the ability to be a part of negotiations that affect its
natural resources sector, which fund the region. The ownership, use, and disposal of
natural resources are all under joint jurisdiction.116 Khanty-Mansi is permitted to be in
charge of its own natural resources, but it has to allow the federal government equal
control. Overall, Khanty-Mansi does not have control as the federal government can
declare their laws unconstitutional. Khanty-Mansi is allowed to participate in
relationships in the sphere of natural resources, taking into account preservation, historic
forms of management, the interests of indigenous minorities, and federal legislation.117
This forces Khanty-Mansi to include other interests when creating economic
relationships, but does leave the federal government out of these relationships. The free
movement of services, goods, financial assets, etc. is supported by the state and measures
will be taken to protect investments.118 This article is almost a threat, reminding the
government that investments in Khanty-Mansi’s natural resource sector, and the transport
of oil and natural gas is more important than anything else to the region. Bodies of state
power and local self-government cannot impose any restrictions on economic
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activities,119 which once again puts the natural resource sector above everything else by
stating that the federal government and local governments in Khanty-Mansi cannot
threaten the ability of the regional government to produce and ship natural gas and oil.
Even in the charter of Khanty-Mansi, the federal government is extremely involved in the
regional economy because of how much money is at stake.
Relations between Tyumen Oblast and Khanty-Mansi are built on the basis of the
autonomy of Khanty-Mansi as an equal subject of the Russian Federation, 120 but unlike
other autonomous subjects of the Russian Federation, Khanty-Mansi is expected to be
legally subordinate to Tyumen. Forcing Khanty-Mansi to follow the laws of Tyumen
Oblast and the federal government takes away part of the autonomy granted to it in the
1992 agreement and prevents it even further from being able to separate if the question
were to arise. Tyumen Oblast and Khanty-Mansi are to coordinate relations through joint
meetings between legislative or executive regional bodies.121 This forces Khanty-Mansi
to coordinate all economic and political relations with both Tyumen and the the federal
government before making any decisions, which rips away more of Khanty-Mansi’s
ability to be autonomous. State bodies in Khanty-Mansi have to participate in the
organization and conduct of elections to Tyumen Oblast’s state bodies, in accordance
with their agreements.122 Participating in elections forces the government of KhantyMansi to all but admit that they are a legal part of Tyumen Oblast, and not their own
autonomous region.
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The legal relationship between Khanty-Mansi and Tyumen Oblast is very
complicated, and even the federal government is not sure which one is in control.123
When the Okrug gained constitutional equality with all other members of the Russian
Federation, it started trying to separate from Tyumen’s control. Khanty-Mansi wanted
more control over the region’s natural resources and the accompanying revenue, which is
why the Oblast wanted control.124 In the Soviet period, Tyumen got to the keep oil and
gas revenues as the “head” of the region, but after the 1993 constitution lost to KhantyMansi, which got a windfall because it was able to control the oil and gas sector within its
borders.125 That alone spurred the conflict between Tyumen and Khanty-Mansi, as
Khanty-Mansi wanted more autonomy to hold onto what it sees as its revenues, while
Tyumen wanted the revenues. The federal government prefers Khanty-Mansi to war with
Tyumen over revenues, and not with the federal government. The federal constitution
gave the Okrug equal rights to a regular Oblast, which then caused further fights between
Tyumen and Khanty-Mansi’s authorities.126 Khanty-Mansi’s political and ethnic
autonomy was severely limited by its legal position as part of Tyumen Oblast, despite
also being a separate entity, which allowed the federal government to maintain control.
These documents form the legal basis of Khanty-Mansi after the fall of the Soviet
Union, where it had been granted a limited amount of political autonomy. Khanty-Mansi
has few powers that are not under the jurisdiction of the federal government. Economic
autonomy is even more limited - Khanty-Mansi can make no deals with foreign or
domestic governments without the knowledge and in some cases, participation, of the
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federal government. Khanty-Mansi is so economically important that the federal
government was not willing to grant it the smallest semblance of true economic
autonomy. The Khanty and the Mansi are not large enough, or united enough, to have
threatened an ethnic conflict if the federal government did not grant the region autonomy.
Khanty-Mansi did not receive the few concessions it did until after all of the republics
had received far more. The regional government is so reliant upon the sale of natural
resources that it was willing to accept the ability to be an independent part of foreign
economic relations even with the federal government's oversight. However, KhantyMansi did receive the ability to mostly self-govern and to have stewardship of the land
and natural resources, which give it a measure of political and economic freedom to make
its own decisions. The federal government has forced it be a part of Tyumen Oblast,
which does not allow it to have much, if any, real political autonomy. The federal
government barely gave Khanty-Mansi political autonomy as they do not want to let the
Okrug separate from the federal government or want more concessions.
There were three waves of political autonomy during this time period. The first
was for the Republic of Tatarstan, a nationalized and wealthy republic, where it received
the most political and economic autonomy. The second was for the other republics,
including the Republic of Bashkortostan, which was also nationalized and wealthy, where
it received an equivalent amount of political autonomy but almost no economic
autonomy. The third was for the regions, including Khanty-Mansi Autonomous OkrugYugra, which was not nationalized but wealthy, where it received almost no political or
economic autonomy.
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Revising and Re-Envisioning Autonomy: 1996-2006
The regional governments took the power provided to them during the early
1990s, working with the federal government to create the legal basis for political
autonomy. After permitting the regions and republics to obtain their autonomy, the
federal government began attempting to legislate it away. The Constitutional Court ruled
that regional sovereignty declarations were unconstitutional in 1997,127 despite having
permitted them to stand for seven years. When Vladimir Putin became the president of
Russia, he worked to strengthen federal central authority by reforming federal-regional
relations.128 Russia was in a slightly better place economically and the federal
government switched tactics under Putin to regain total central control.
The federal government passed laws to ensure that Khanty-Mansi was unable to
use the little economic autonomy it had been granted. A 1996 law on Natural Resource
Use in Khanty-Mansi states that relations between resource users on the Okrug’s territory
are regulated equally by federal law, present law, and the Okrug’s normative acts,129
which functioned as an attempt to gain a little bit of control back from the federal
government. It failed because the federal government could come in and upend relations
if Khanty-Mansi looked like it was becoming too autonomous. A federal law on
Production Sharing Agreements states that in order to develop an oil field, the Oblast or
Okrug in question must get the permission of the State Duma, which caused oil fields to
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get cut when Khanty-Mansi and Tyumen could not get along.130 This law also prevents
natural resource rich areas of Russia from developing without the federal government’s
knowledge and permission.131 Combined, these laws allowed the federal government to
have extreme oversight of Khanty-Mansi’s rich oil and natural gas fields and full
knowledge of when Khanty-Mansi wanted to develop a new one, and use that knowledge
to control Khanty-Mansi.
Governor Filipenko, who was appointed in 1991, led the okrug in its attempts to
secede from Tyumen Oblast.132 Khanty-Mansi refused to participate in the 1996 Tyumen
elections,133 as a form of protest against the oblast. According to Khanty-Mansi’s own
charter, it has to participate in the elections, but the government was extremely invested
in separating even symbolically from Tyumen. Authorities in Khanty-Mansi relented
quickly after the federal government stepped in, but in the end only 15% of eligible
voters participated, which invalidated the election because 25% of voters legally must
participate.134 Khanty-Mansi did not participate in the second round of voting.135 In July
1997, in an attempt to solve the problem, the Russian Constitutional Court ruled that
Khanty-Mansi was simultaneously an equal federation and Tyumen subject, but that it
was allowed to secede whenever it wanted if the federal government could validate it
constitutionally,136 which would never happen. Khanty-Mansi was also forced to continue
participating in oblast elections,137 and thus legally remain subordinate to Tyumen.
130
131
132

Wilson, 186.
Ibid.
Orttung, Lussier, and Paretskaya, 237.

133

Ibid., 238.

134

Ibid.

135

Ibid.

136

Orttung, Lussier, and Paretskaya, 239.

137

Ibid.

44

In October of 1997, the State Duma adopted a new law stating that regional
authorities had to cooperate with the Foreign Ministry when they negotiated with foreign
governments,138 a move that would affect regions like Khanty-Mansi, Tatarstan, and
Bashkortostan greatly as they have a significant export business. The federal government
must be included in these export negotiations as of passage of the law. This allows the
government to circumvent the regions’ bargaining tools by forcing negotiations to take
place under their watch. It also creates a situation where the federal government is always
aware of the amount of money the regions stand to gain in negotiations. The federal
government controls how federal funds are allocated and disbursed to each region, which
allows the government to have both cohesiveness and the ability to undermine any
regional autonomy.139 However, these regions have a significant amount of natural gas
and oil in reserve and in production, which allow them to have enough energy sales to
access global markets, providing them with a useful resource when bargaining with the
federal government for funds.140 Khanty-Mansi’s large global sales are not enough to win
over the federal government, as the federal government can very easily use one of the
other laws that it passed to crack down on a different part of the natural resource sector.
As for Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, their global sales are not nearly as large, but they do
have a larger possibility for ethnic conflict. The law also stated that the regions have to
inform the foreign ministry when they have international projects, and any legal
documents have to be approved by the ministry before being signed. 141 The ministry can
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open regional branches whenever it wants, and any trade missions have to coordinate
with Russian Embassies.142 This law was targeted at energy producing regions, which
provide most of the state’s exports and budget revenues. It allowed the federal
government to suppress some autonomy from these regions by forcing them to allow
federal oversight on trade negotiations.
In 1998, Bashkortostan’s President Rakhimov claimed that the center was
uninterested in the political and economic situation of the regions, and that he had the
power to appoint Supreme Court judges, a power held by the federal government and not
the regions.143 In April 1998, a regional law allowed residents to be Tatar citizens but not
Russian citizens, because the regional government felt that Russian state passports
diminished Tatarstan as an ethnic state.144 This was put in place by the regional
government to appease Tatar nationalists who felt that the Republic was not sovereign
enough. The federal law on citizenship was amended fairly quickly in February 1999 to
allow regional citizens to have an extra page in their passport in their local language,145 to
coincide with the Tatar law instead of force it to change. Tatarstan had another law
allowing the president to appoint mayors and local officials, which actively violated the
Russian constitution and the federal government did nothing.146 Bashkortostan could also
openly break federal law.147 The federal government was unlikely to crack down on
regions with lucrative natural resource sectors and nationalists.
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On May 13th, 2000 the government created a total of seven federal districts
encompassing Russia’s 89 regions, each headed by a presidential representative, which
established a vertical power that worked to undermine regional autonomy. 148 This action
not only granted the president’s regional representatives more authority in the regions, it
merged the regions into federal districts to centralize power. The representatives in the
districts are to be appointed by, dismissed by, and subordinate to the President of the
Russian Federation. The main tasks of the representatives are to organize the relevant
federal district, organize control over the execution of state bodies decisions in the federal
districts, etc.149 This was done in an attempt to reverse the fragmentation of Russia,150
and create a powerful center from a weak center with powerful regions and republics.
The central government was worried that large regions would set themselves strongly
against Moscow and would potentially separate from the Federation while small regions
would not.151 The federal districts allowed the federal government to have more direct
control over the regions and republics by centralizing power and appointing
representatives that report directly to the federal government. Also, in 2000, the Russian
federal constitutional court demanded that all regional constitutions be amended to
comply with Russian federal law. 152 One of the constitutions in question was
Bashkortostan’s – in part because of the earlier law stating that the president has to speak
Bashkir, as only 20% of the population was Bashkir. 153 This law was ruled
unconstitutional because it placed the Bashkirs over all of the other ethnic groups in the
148

Sakwa, 130, 141.
Ukaz Prezidenta RF ot 13 maya 2000 g. N 849 "O polnomochnom predstavitele Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii v
federal'nom okruge" (s izmeneniyami i dopolneniyami).
150
Traynor.
151
Peter Kirkow, 2.
152
Gabidullin and Edwards.
153
Traynor.
149

47

region. The federal government was beginning to retake control of the regions through
laws and court rulings that would allow the federal government to consolidate central
power.
On April 19th, 2002 the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan adopted the
revised federal constitution which lists out individual rights and liberties, and the
adoption of the new constitution required the autonomous republic to provide those rights
as well.154 Amendments to the constitution were passed officially stating that Tatarstan is
a part of Russia.155 Tatarstan made these constitutional changes as a response to the
federal court ruling, despite how anti-federal government the Republic had always been.
It was easier to comply with the new federal government than to fight back and
potentially lose autonomy.
On July 7th, 2003, Federal Law No. 95-FZ “On Amendments and Additions to the
Federal Law on General Principles for the Organization of Legislative and Executive
Bodies of State Power of the Subjects of the Russian Federation” passed, which
established that all power-sharing agreements currently in existence had to be approved
within two years or be canceled.156 The central government had begun to view the
bilateral treaties as undermining the integrity of the country, and they canceled about
thirty of the forty as a consequence of the growing negative sentiment.157 To the regions
bilateral treaties had helped them to form a real statehood, establish a balance of power,
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and defuse societal, or ethnic, tensions.158 The remaining ten, which included Tatarstan,
kept their bilateral treaties but were worried about the future of regional political
autonomy. Another 2003 federal law stated that the head of state in a region is the main
conductor of the political process to signing treaties between regions in the Russian
Federation,159 and by this point all of them were appointed by the federal government.
In 2004, a new draft agreement to renew the 1994 power-sharing agreement
between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Bashkortostan was submitted, and it
was not considered by the federal government.160 As the treaty was not successfully reapproved, Bashkortostan lost its autonomy on July 7th, 2005.161 Then, in fall 2005,
Bashkortostan sent Putin an appeal to renew the center – regional relations, which would
have started the process of updating the treaty, 162 but was also unsuccessful.
Unfortunately, despite the Bashkir government’s attempts, it was unable to obtain
autonomy again. The government was unable to enact any reprisals for the federal
government’s actions because anything to cut the government off from its most lucrative
resource - oil and natural gas - would have affected the republic’s economy just as
negatively.
The federal government took a step back to prevent an actual independence
movement from forming, allowing Tatarstan to have laws that violated the constitution
and a power-sharing agreement which no one else had to been allowed to have at that
point. The federal government was most worried about instability in Tatarstan, and
because of the powerful wealthy regional government allowed Tatarstan to maintain
158
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autonomy. In 2001, Khanty-Mansi achieved de facto legal separation from Tyumen
Oblast, but that just led to instability and affected investment in oil in the region.163
Khanty-Mansi, due to its extremely large amount of oil reserves, is a top place in Russia
for foreign investment,164 and could not afford to lose the foreign investment in its oil
fields, which made the long sought for separation from Tyumen a problem. However,
Khanty-Mansi is still part of Tyumen Oblast, and the federal government took away their
political autonomy. Mansir Ayupov, a Bashkir Nationalist and aide to President
Rakhimov, claimed that, “we’ve never said we’re independent, in no document,”165
summing up the line the Bashkir government tried to walk during the 90s and early
2000s, between outright calling for independence and having some sovereignty without
leaving the Russian Federation. Ultimately, they were unable to maintain sovereignty.
This time period saw the end of autonomy for almost all regions and republics,
except for the Republic of Tatarstan. Nationalism and natural resources were not enough
in most cases to maintain autonomy. Khanty-Mansi and Bashkortostan did not have
enough leverage to convince the federal government to renew their power-sharing
agreements, but Tatarstan did.
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The End of Autonomy: 2007-2017
From 2007 to 2017, the federal government officially centralized power. By 2009,
the only remaining power-sharing agreements were with Chechnya and Tatarstan, and by
then the terms had been renegotiated to the point that the agreements were mostly
symbolic.166 Tatarstan lost its autonomy by the summer of 2017, officially ending the
system of regional autonomy. However, this time period saw an increase in the amount of
anti-government protests in the regions as the population was angered by the repeal of
regional political autonomy.
In 2007, when the federal government had managed to take away autonomy from
almost all other regions, Tatarstan broke out into protests again and the government again
worried about an independence struggle and allowed Tatarstan to keep its autonomy.
There were more protests during the Russian economic downturn over what Tatars saw
as the federal government overreaching and economically controlling Tatarstan when it
began to siphon more money from the region to the federal budget. Then, the Republic of
Tatarstan and the federal government signed a new treaty, which acted both as an
extension of the last agreement and a brand-new agreement.167 Tatarstan received this
deal from the government while other regions’ agreements were in the process of being
canceled.168 The Treaty with the Russian Federation on the Delimitation of Jurisdictional
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Subjects and Mutual Delegation of Powers, signed on June 26th 2007, helped to codify
the continuing status of the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan. The most
important part of the treaty is that it lays out that the delimitation of jurisdictional
subjects and powers between Tatarstan and Russia is affected by the Constitution of the
Russian Federation.169 This forces the republic to continue legislating without
contradicting the federal government in order to allow the federal government more
oversight and control over the region. The treaty grants Tatarstan full state authority.170
The new treaty takes a harsher stance on the Republic’s laws, more aggressively stating
that they must follow federal law to be considered legitimate. It also officially codifies
the new legal status of the Republic, as having authority within the bounds of its territory
as long as its authority is under the federal government, which is a form of federalism.
Most importantly, the treaty states that the federal government and Tatarstan’s
Cabinet of Ministers have to make agreements jointly in regards to economic and
environmental issues,171 which do involve the extraction and processing of natural
resources. Even through the federal government was willing to extend Tatarstan’s
political autonomy, not something they did for every region and republic, the federal
government was not willing to allow Tatarstan continued economic freedom. The
republic only demanded autonomy as a means for increased economic freedom, and the
federal government was not willing to allow it to continue if they could not be involved.
They did not completely take away Tatarstan’s ability to control natural resources at this
time because of continued fears of separatist activity. Tatarstan could still carry out
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international economic relations with foreign states and other parts of Russia, as well as
sign agreements for the implementation of international economic relations.172 This
allowed Tatarstan to continue to directly control both their international relations,
including the oil and natural gas trade, and creates a situation where the Russian
Federation maintains some measure of control over Tatarstan’s ability to resolve issues
that arise from oil and natural gas production. While other republics and regions were
actively losing their sovereignty, Tatarstan received a renewal because the federal
government understood that the situation would become tense if not outright dangerous if
the separatists became enraged over the loss of sovereignty. The situation had already
turned sour in other regions.
There is no ethnic nationalism in Khanty-Mansi, as there have been no protests
along ethnic lines, no protection of Khanty and Mansi culture, and certainly no
separatists. While other ethnic groups are diametrically opposed to the central
government, these are more opposed to the oil companies and only somewhat to the
central government. However, in 2010, they did protest Medvedev’s appointment of
Natalia Komarova for governor instead of Filipenko.173 Unlike other protests that have
fallen along ethnic lines, most of Khanty-Mansi was protesting Komarova. KhantyMansi’s parliament endorsed the appointment, 174 the only check and balance to the
ascension of a regional governor, before protests began on the 14th of February 2010. 175
Komarova would take power despite the protests.
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During the time period of her appointment, rumors started that she was appointed
because of her close ties to Gazprom, implying that she would work for the oil and gas
companies instead of the people.176 This is a real worry in Khanty-Mansi, because the oil
companies are extremely powerful. Even in the 90’s Lukoil had the most power in the
region because of its control over most of the local economy.177 The oil companies in
Khanty-Mansi are actively pushing the Khanty off their land for drilling, because Khanty
land is in the middle of a part of Siberia that provides half of overall Russian oil
extraction.178 And as the Khanty are a small part of the population, isolated, and not
united, oil companies are not afraid of reprisals. Lukoil West Siberia built a road for oil
drilling in 2014 through some of the very last free Khanty land.179 The company puts
itself over the locals’ wants, in the thinking that if the locals successfully stop oil
production on sacred Khanty sites, that it will lead to the ruin of Khanty-Mansi’s
economy. 180 The regional and federal governments have gone along with this because
they tacitly agree with it. Anti-oil company protests have begun breaking out in KhantyMansi because of a series of oil spills that are actively affecting the local way of life. 181
However, the Khanty and the Mansi will never have a successful protest without the
assistance of the other citizens of the region. In part, this is because of how few of them
there are, and the fact that the population relies heavily upon the production and sale of
natural resources.
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Protests in Bashkortostan did not really break out after autonomy was officially
revoked in 2007, because of how quietly it went away. It was only when it became clear
what the Bashkirs had lost that protests officially broke out. One wave of protests began
on March 3rd, 2011, when the Bashkir Youth Union (BYI) went on a hunger strike in
response to police putting pressure on nationalists, and they demanded the release of
activists that had been thrown in prison.182 BYI stated that it was defending Bashkir
language and culture, because the central government restricted Bashkir-language schools
and state media broadcasts, which had been almost completely eliminated.183 Essentially,
it was not until the federal government, which had already taken away political autonomy
in the region, began to cut down on Bashkir culture that nationalists reacted, because it
was the first moment they could point to of federal overreach.
In 2013, Russian authorities made calling for separatism punishable by three to
five years in prison, 184 which only served to anger regional separatists, who to this point
had never fully vanished. The passing of this law would have a ripple effect in
Bashkortostan and Tatarstan, where activists would be jailed. On October 11th 2016, the
twenty-sixth anniversary of the sovereignty declaration, Bashkir nationalists assembled
because they were angered that the central government had destroyed the document.185
They complained that Putin suppressed the freedom of the regional president’s office,
distorted Bashkir history, and closed Bashkir schools and facilities in an attempt to
undermine the language.186 The Bashkirs have become more assertive in defending what
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they see as their rights to their own republic.187 They are a minority in their own republic,
and faced past marginalization, so these fears are not unfounded. Bashkir activists want
the return of the 1990 sovereignty declaration, a true federal state, Bashkir control of
national resources, a true regional presidency, reopened Bashkir schools and institutions,
and the end of the repression of Bashkir national organizations. 188 Bashkir nationalists
are very vocal in the region, and are active in leading anti-government protests, but there
are not a large number of them.
In mid-July 2017, the state council of Tatarstan appealed to the federal
government in the hopes of extending the power-sharing agreement, as it was set to
expire on July 24th 2017.189 On July 24th 2017, the federal government allowed the
power-sharing agreement to expire, ignoring the Tatarstan State Council’s proposal
completely. 190 Now, at least fourteen of Tatarstan’s constitutional articles and several
federal laws all need to be amended191 to reflect the new legal status of the republic. The
office of the president is no longer legal, so the status of current president Rustam
Minnikhanov is in question. Tatar parliamentarians have petitioned the United Nations
for independence,192 going over the Russian Federation’s government completely. In part,
this is to appease the angry Tatar population. The regional government will never let
Tatarstan become its own independent country because their economy could collapse if
Russia cut it off from exporting natural resources. Ultimately, Tatarstan lost the ability to

187
188
189
190
191
192

Goble.
Ibid.
Stratfor Worldview.
“Russia Revoking Tatarstan’s Autonomy,” European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity. 9 August 2017.
Ibid.
European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity.

56

maintain autonomy because the federal government found an excuse to allow the powersharing agreement to die.
In 2017, mandatory ethnic language classes were in jeopardy all over Russia after
the Prosecutor-General’s Office was asked to investigate the problem, the central
government claiming that these classes are illegal.193 On August 28th, the federal
government officially ordered the Prosecutor-General to ensure that all regions had
canceled their classes.194 On September 7th, the Republic of Tatarstan’s Education
Ministry stated that these attempts to end mandatory Tatar studies contradict federal and
regional laws guaranteeing them the right to make local ethnic languages official state
languages.195 The federal government will be forcing Tatarstan to cancel Tatar classes. It
was not just separatists protesting over this, as many Tatars view it as the central
government trying to take away their culture. Protests broke out in Bashkortostan on
September 16th, 2017, as a consequence of the revocation of mandatory Bashkir language
classes in regional schools.196 The Bashkirs saw this as evidence that the federal
government does not view them as a valid segment of the population and that it is willing
to tear their culture away from them.
Protests in Tatarstan tend to break out when the federal government is seen to be
taking away the autonomy or culture of the Tatars. Nationalism there has remained strong
for decades and that is extremely unlikely to change. Ethnic nationalism, which had been
evident, but not a problem before the cancellation of political autonomy in Bashkortostan
became a problem afterwards. Nationalists saw every action taken in Bashkortostan as
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anti-Bashkir act. In some cases, like the closing of Bashkir language facilities, they were
absolutely correct. Nationalism is nonexistent in Khanty-Mansi because there is no large
ethnic minority to come together under a similar culture to protest against the federal
government. The closest Khanty-Mansi has managed to come still are a few small
protests against the oil companies, which have not been successful.
During this time period, even Tatarstan lost autonomy. Not even nationalism in
that republic was enough to maintain sovereignty when the federal government decided
to take it away. Ultimately, the explosion of regional protests and the possession of
natural resource revenues were not enough to convince the federal government to allow
the last politically autonomous republic to maintain autonomy, or to give it back to the
regions that had lost it. The federal government had been more concerned with the
centralization of power than ethnic uprisings, and the regional governments were
concerned about reprisals from the federal government and did not fight back.

58

Conclusion
In the 1990s, the government of the Republic of Tatarstan was able to push for
more political and economic freedom because the central government was weak and
worried about the consequence of angering the Tatar government. Tatarstan for two
decades successfully held onto the autonomy granted to it as a region with an ethnic
minority because it is so rich in natural resources. A poorer region would not have had
the money to bankroll the government in case of getting cut off from obtaining federal
subsidies or to successfully threaten the federal government with the risk of an
independence struggle cutting off the economy. That was independence in all but name.
Natural resources have provided Tatarstan with the ability to separate itself from the
federal government in order to have some semblance of independence, but as the republic
does not have a foreign border, the regional government understood that it could not
become sovereign. The republic has had the potential for an ethnic conflict simmering for
decades, because of how strongly Tatar separatists have positioned themselves against the
federal government. An actual conflict is unlikely to erupt, but elites did use the threat of
an independence struggle to bolster their push for political autonomy. As of July 24th,
2017, the Republic of Tatarstan is no longer an autonomous republic. However, the
government has not given up on obtaining semi-autonomy. Despite Tatarstan’s desire for
a return to autonomy, anger at the central government, and rise in nationalism, with Putin
in power, it is highly unlikely that Tatarstan will ever regain its previous legal status. The
Republic of Tatarstan was the Russian region that had sovereignty the longest, and was
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one of the few that is majority national minority, and natural resources provided Tatarstan
with the ability to seize sovereignty in the early 90’s, and they are the reason that
Tatarstan cannot fight for sovereignty now.
The discovery and production of oil during the Soviet Union allowed the Republic
of Bashkortostan to seize autonomy from the center and maintain it for a decade.
However, the reliance on refining and selling natural resources meant that they were not
bargaining from a strong position during the 1990s. As a consequence of natural resource
revenues and nationalism, the republic was able to get some concessions from the federal
government, including a high level of political autonomy, but was only allowed to gain
some economic autonomy. Bashkortostan has the right to make its own political and
economic decisions, under the oversight and laws of the federal government. It was easier
to revoke Bashkortostan’s autonomy because of how relatively insignificant the Bashkir
nationalists were in the region. The risk of a successful insurrection was fairly low, as
there were not enough people to have made a difference against the might of the central
government. As well, Bashkortostan’s ability to manufacture, produce, and sell oil and
natural gas – its most lucrative asset – hinges on the assistance of the federal government.
Bashkortostan does not have a border with a foreign country, and as such cannot
transport any goods without the agreement of the federal government and the use of their
transportation systems. The Bashkir government had briefly tried to fight back before
realizing that it was hopeless, and accepted the quiet death of their autonomy in the
knowledge that they could not risk their economy for a likely to fail rebellion. The
Bashkirs will continue to protest for their rights, but the regional government will
continue to prevent it from breaking out into anything more than a protest to avoid losing

60

their economic situation. The Bashkortostan government will continue to attempt to
protect the rights of the Bashkirs in order to prevent separatists from breaking out into a
full revolution, and petition for more autonomy, but the federal government is unlikely to
allow the Republic to regain it.
Khanty-Mansi’s status as an autonomous region began early in the USSR as a
consequence of the push to create homelands for national minorities in Siberia. It was
only after that had passed that the central government discovered that Khanty-Mansi had
oil and understood exactly how much money was at stake if Khanty-Mansi was allowed
to rule itself. Autonomy in Khanty-Mansi formed as sovereignty in name only. Almost all
freedoms the federal government allowed the region were also handed to Tyumen Oblast,
abridged later with federal laws, or granted to the federal government. Oil and natural gas
in other regions allowed them to grasp sovereignty, but in Khanty-Mansi it directly
prevented the government from being able to have any. Every agreement made with the
federal government about sovereignty did not grant Khanty-Mansi control over natural
resources and foreign economic relations, both of which meant that Khanty-Mansi was
not autonomous at all. When the bilateral treaties were signed, Khanty-Mansi’s
government had to take what was offered, in the understanding that it was not receiving
an actual deal. The confusing relationship with Tyumen Oblast contributed to the lack of
autonomy, as it meant that Khanty-Mansi has constantly been fighting with the Oblast
over who is in charge and cannot call for further autonomy from the federal government
until they obtain it fully from Tyumen first. As well, the Khanty and Mansi were too
small and isolated to have visibly protested in their ancestral homeland. There was never
any risk of Khanty-Mansi erupting in a rebellion against the federal government. Like
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every other region, Khanty-Mansi no longer has an active power-sharing agreement, and
quite literally, is autonomous in name only now.
The political autonomy system in Russia formed after the collapse of the Soviet
Union as a way to appease the regions, especially those who produced the most
economically necessary natural resources for the future of the country. Without resourcerich regional governments cooperating with the federal government, it was not clear that
Russia would ever recover from its economic troubles after the fall of the Soviet Union.
Therefore, the federal government allowed regional governments to seize sovereignty.
How much political autonomy they received was dependent on both how large and
lucrative their natural resources sectors are, and how likely they were to erupt in an ethnic
struggle if they were not granted political autonomy. The regional governments attempted
to balance the fact that they could not economically sustain a revolt against the federal
government, with the federal government’s fear that a revolt would be disastrous. The
federal government officially proved as of August 2017 that the regions would never cut
the federal government off from oil and gas or break into an ethnic struggle if autonomy
was revoked.
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